The Semantics of Madness

Avoiding madness seems to at least require opinions.

Any true opinion is rational enough to be above madness.

But there are some that are wrong about their most basic opinions. Let me give examples.

There is a dubious rule which guides some people to think the second-to-worst is actually the worst, or something moderately good is actually not moderately good, or the best is actually the second-to-best.

Philosophers at least value their opinions.

Which means they actually know that opinions aren't madness. (In this way, they aren't wrong, so they are rational beings).

You see, assuming opinions are rational can do the same service as having rational opinions, if the end result is someone who isn't wrong.

In semantics this is true even if it is only true semantically. So, in effect the philosopher is rational even if his opinions are not right, as long as they are not wrong.

So, in effect, all a philosopher needs is an opinion if he wishes to prove rationality, that and the ability for ethical correctness.

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