Laying the Fallacy of Knowledge to Rest

See also: Laying the Fallacy of Knowledge to Rest, Part 2

Perhaps books contain paradoxes.

Perhaps they do not.

Would not one demonstrste knowledge not found in the other?

Wouldn't we say, if we have paradoxes, we know something of them?

And, if our knowledge is not paradoxical, we know something better than we know a paradox?

Now what if, to the exaggersted mind, there is always a choice between puzzlement, which is to say, philosophy, and something of a more trivial nature which is less vexing, as it is less puzzling?

Isn't it true we have a choice at least between philosophy and something somewhat simpler?

Now if we see that knowledge itself could easily be either vexing or simple, and that nothing goes beyond the mere perception of qualities, as nothing at the most basic level surpasses the senses in knowledge, and what we mean by knowledge is something rudimentary, it appears that if the choice is between vexation and simplicity, either is knowledge manifest, as either is s rudimentary quality...

If, on the other hand, rudimentary were not adequate, we would be forced to find something more puzzling than vexation, and while such mwy be found, we might be hard-pressed to find it....

A similar, difficult knowledge sounds exactly like what is trivial or instead paradoxical, so it is largely not much different, although it may differ in degree...
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