PLATONIC MOMENTS IN THE LIFE OF NATHAN COPPEDGE

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What we have conceived of resembles Plato's system...

Yes, there is a class of immortals, a class of tacticals, and a class appeased by passion.

Now, surely we will try to integrate these parts, if we are to find harmony.

How, for example, could I integrate 'immortality' with 'tactics'?

We have already described the immortals as being more thoughtful than the others.

At least, they are concerned with something less transient.

For example, I said that 'tactics' is required because of neediness.

If we ignore long-term tactics, that seems to be the case...

Now, if I am eternity, I certainly have a weak enemy, whom I try to agree with.

Obviously.

And this 'enemy' would be called 'modularity' I suppose.

Modularity is an enemy you could duel with, to try to establish harmony.

The end result would surely be more dimensional!

For sure!

And if I am not a god, then surely I would wish to be more dimensional!

I am in agreement.

What people want appears to be a dimensional world, as I suspected!

That is what you have suggested, but what are our options for a dimensional world?

Of course, what we mean by a dimensional world is a world that is easier and more interesting!

Wouldn't everyone inevitably migrate towards such a world?

Except for those unfortunates who do not conceive of a life of peace!

I suppose soldiers would seem unfortunate, because they expect war.

War is obviously not what we mean by this form of evolution.

Then what are the weaknesses?

The weakness of reality appears to be fantastic 'unreality'.

How so?

Well, death and everything that brings death is ideally unreal.

How could we oppose desire?

We might define a world as a place for appreciating both.

What if unreality is the gentlest concept that can be applied to our reality?

That seems obvious, now that I think of it!

What if unreality is the most meaningful concept that can be applied to our reality?

Then we would inevitably migrate to somewhere more interesting!


----Nathan Coppedge, "The Telos".

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"We find causation meaningless, so objects are real! Of course! Even if they participate with our minds, that doesn't mean that the objects or the mind have to be absolute! Nor does it guarantee that we don't have a mind. To prove a mind does not require proving a complete mind, for according to relativity, any kind of mind is, in some way, a mind. Therefore, whatever has an opinion that it is a mind, is in some way, officially, a mind. For any sort of mind is capable of meaningful translation, even if the perspective that translates is not the original mind. The mind itself is a kind of object, even if there is no standard to objectify it. The absence of standards is never reason enough to prove that something is without reality."
---Nathan Coppedge, June 2015.

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*It may be noted that the implication here is that all experiences are perfect which are not conceptualisms, which is perhaps a crutch, but a good one, particularly when it is noticed that perfect pain is distinguished from perfect pleasure, and some terms may be lightened by critical evaluation. E.g. if experience is ‘best defined’ to be perfect, perfect pain now means something absurd or paradoxical, like all evil things. Pleasure, on the other hand, must become complex to realize its potential, or must be treated as something universal or inherent. If pain must be present and cannot be evaluated, this is simply the occurrence of a metaphysical paradox which says that pain is paradoxical in spite of the fact that the perfect world has not been achieved. Small critical details (‘errata’) remain with the least solvable problems. The most obvious solutions to those problems, on the other hand, announce themselves via their importance in language, or as happenstantial virtues----things that only have ‘ultimate’  importance in the perfect world. ---Nathan Coppedge, The Dimensional Phenomenology Toolkit (italics mine).