On an earlier article concerning Qualific Operators

It may serve to clarify that the earlier article on qualifics deals not essentially with the death of mathematics in any erroneous or far-blown poetical sensibility (although it is a poetical sensibility; to say it is poetic for the sake of destroying mathematics would be erroneous or even specious by induction) so much as with categorics as an interpretive system akin to philosophy, that is dealing inhensively--inherently and iteratively or correlatively--with words, thereby replacing in one frame of vision a context for holistic systemology with a context for the holistic systemologization of methods comparable or analogous to math and math systems;

Where in one context a few pieces may be moved to make a beautiful battlefield of math operators as chess pieces, in a further frame of reference initial pieces are partly defined solely by the field of play; if a field is itself an operator, it is arbitrary and erroneous to pick one field alone; this isn't to say that math isn't real, but rather than the just field of correspondence is a 'mutualization' of context-concepts in a balanced manner; otherwise field may fail to define the operator;

Rejecting this previous discourse as in some way typical and fallible (under the context of math itself), the conclusion becomes under a simplification that a math of fields or math of maths is to be emphasized in defining math per se; it could be that my experience is limited enough that these things are real as a prefigurement of any real math concepts; in another framework, the framework of the previous article-as-valid, theory-concepts such as thought experiments may be the higher form of a ground for math itself; it may be that small initial compromises, seeming small, create drastic errors such as the notorious unsolvability problem;

In that context, the proposition of the 'death of math' is not so much a declaration against the validity of numbers and number-theory as it is a dismissal of conclusions drawn under the espousal of 'towers' of theory dependant on a ground that is not theory-consistent; the self-devouring logic is of two faces then: one in which it gains two faces by dependence on 'fundamentals' as a ground (with the acknowledgement of variance at high levels) and another in which theory-coherence or field-coherent thought at basis provides a ground for the contextualization OF contextualization at high levels of thought; in the second case contextualization is already prefigured by the addresal of the contextual idea in the contextual pretext; in the first case there is a duplicity between the presumption of the fundamental and the erratic brilliance of stepping beyond 'ground's idea' so posited;

By positing that the basic is basic, from a certain perspective coherence is compromised; the addresal of coherence is also the addresal intrinsically of fundamental coherence, that is the field-specificity of original idea, at the most pithy level afforded; this is not to say that the operator is divine or describes all math (because inherently math is more holistic than its terms, or may lose reality) instead rather that system in some forms embodies an equivalence to its operators; it is not that system is extensible with the right tools, instead rather as systems and tools gain specificity or perfection, a gain is made in proportion to equivalence, perhaps via the relavence of field or field-coherence;

As an idea I don't know how this applies except through a dimensional and categoric framework I've called Motism or Hypercubism (the second closer to artwork than anything systemic); its possible ideas of beauty embodied in Eridianism or Limnics in their brightness are coherent with systems thinking, however the connection has been limited consciously to me only to symbological representations and not anything strictly rational, except as a sort of poetic game;

Thoughts as Natural Objects

STONE THOUGHTS



[it was brilliant, here is the shell: the carapace is a math for something poetical]

IRON THOUGHTS



[here is the machine, what does it do?: the entire idea was a scheme on paper]

SILVER THOUGHTS



[I found it there: it was as an idea of place]

COPPER THOUGHTS



[it was like that: as of a found object holds the idea]

RIVER THOUGHTS



[it was participant in an eclectic scheme]

Geometry of Intellectual Caveat

VOTING FOR ALIENS

FOR SOME REASON THEY'RE MAJOR LEAGUE, THEY GO THERE FOR THEIR END(GG)

VOT VOT

1. Conciliation

While you assume this, I disagree, yet by my reasoning yes



2. The Eventuality

Self consciousness requires a loop of self-reference whereby it validates its will when it knows



3. The Epiphany

What is inherent is real by its own authority



4. The Schism

Sometimes weakness & strength as of other conventional opposites are not comparable (are not consistent)

Nate Coppedge & Hypercubism

HHHH1 (433H) (NQQ)

OCCea

Nate Coppedge: Hyper-Cubist

A work titled Corruscated Clock soon available as a giclee print or something similar; the ArtistRising website has me hopeful, even if art isn't gambling

I've decided to use my standard name for art advertising, since everyone in my family prefers this name;

Errors, Ideas, Philosophical, Of

Newton: universalizable principles are not always applicable to every case (meaningfully or in simplicity; reversed ad absurdium) there are examples, such as 'balloons float'[although something of that mass does not normally levitate] or 'wheels move heavy objects great distances, even on a slope' [applique lever to initial height]

Descartes: in diagrams, the argument following within the blogscript, Differing Systems and Counterproofs

Hume: inherency of causation: if something else happens, something else is there, empirically in terms of law; how else does one determine what is real except by law? [if: there is no law] how may one be certain of the ground at all for unprinciple? [hume ~ we don't know] How can on esay expereince has not found a ground to exist? If so, if it has a ground, is not the inherency of causation evidence of law via its own foundation? Not-knowing, experience still may be unknowable; yet with a ground for self, it may know, or the knowable may be the unknowable; fallacy in idea that experience does not know by unknown other [the "eye" or "you fucked me" fallacy, put in the lowest words] In higher thought, knowledge may well be a worldly experience, yet knoweldge that is not qualified by its own experience ahs teh opposite problem, which may not be validated by mere paper in either way__

Rawls (justice theory): there are few articulate principles of blindness, and one must know that one is being principled to be just [best application, 'razor' for unqualified jurors] assumes limited results

Modularism: ensures consistent gains, yet may deny archetypal states, suited to archetypal fields in which fields must themselves be archetypal or denied

Differing Systems and Counterproofs, Criticis of Arithmatic

THEORETICAL RELEVANCE FROM INFORMATION

LEADING TO INFO THEORY

Paradoxica Amelioratora: not a bullet poem: extensis

Initial thought:

0 + 1 should be 0 not 1 (else -1 + 0 = 1)

(that when 0 is not a-axial with one, it must be axial)

AND

questioning 0 + 1 - 0 = 1 because 0 is less than 1

(that 1 is neither negative nor positive)

qualifics

--Eucaleh


QUALIFIC OPERATORS 'QUALIFICS' / DIFFERING SYSTEMS AND COUNTERPROOFS [EXTENDED]

Consider the basis for mathematics, a notion of one and zero, being and nothing, value or void;

Although operations with the analogical one and zero are basic to mathematics, the use of non-numerical signs implies
that numbers are subset within a systemic context; although we need not conclude anything about this pre-condition,
one may go so far as to say that there is a slipperiness in operators:

For example, we may simultaneously posit that:

1 + 0 = 1 not 0 AND
1 - 0 = 1 not 0

[10 = the Scales, thus 10 is not 1,0 ; to posit gain is to posit complex gain in numbers]

In the context of the digital, comparing the set 1, 0 to the number 10 creates a schism;
the first is pared until it requires systemic referrant, while in the second case the system
becomes accretively both ambiguous and complex

Questioning the view that 0 + 1 - 0 = 1 because for example 0 is less than 1 creates the idea that
earlier statements might be redefined (dangerously) with unexpected results. One might look also
at two other related expressions:

One might then claim that 0 - 1 = 0 not -1 (else 1 - 0 = 1/2)

Evidence might be cited in the equivalent expressions [(1 + 1) - ( 0 + 0)] = 2 not 1 yet [(1 - 0) - (1 - 0)] = 0 not 1,
the first is said to equal 2 and the second zero; simultaneously it is held that two positives amount to positive,
and two negatives amount to positive, however in this case that isn't true. If it is not negatives
operating, how may one explain that one expression is greater than the other with approximately identical terms?
(e.g. how is the extension [(1 + 1) - (0 + 0)] + [(1 - 0) - (1 - 0)] > [(1 - 0) - (1 - 0)] + [(1 - 0) - (1 - 0)] + 1 ? ad infinitum?)

Also, 0 + 1 should be 0 not 1 (else -1 + 0 = 1)

Responding to this, notation may be altercated such that:

1 balanced = 0 [1--> + <--1>] AND
1 unbalanced = 0 balanced [1--> + 1--> = 0--> or 1--0-->]

This view, although not elaborated, meets greater adequacy in geometry, for example that the digit two is not
more axial than one, but rather an extension of number through zero

Considering briefly what such a mathematics would entail, one might suppose that
any additional one is a separate entity, thus by identity all ones are opposed unless via unifying;

hence here non-unified 1 + 1 + 1 = 0{3 (this might be equivalent to space divided in three portions)

also, unified ones do nothing to the strength of 0

hence (1 + 1 + 1)--> = 3{0 (this might be equivalent to a non-spacial qualitative value of 3)

the expression x{y might be compared to 'x root y' or 'x stem y' superficially but doesn't entail any operation specifically so much as a context-point within which operations may occur

saying that 0{3 is 1/3 would be wrong, for its implicit here that 3 is a subset of 0 that still has for lack of a better term quantitative value
(the best conclusion may be that there is an implicit non-spacial geometry depending on concepts of distinction-as-variable)

also, saying that 3}0 is 1 or 3 in a traditional sense is misleading; the distinction between 2{0 and
3{0 may be seen in the same way as 2}0 + 1}0 = 3}0 in the sense of piling coins, however it is more accurate to say that systemically 0{0 is of greatest importance,
while qualifically 99{0 is like a mobile operator and 0{99 a matter of many dimensions as yet unqualified


Standard Arithmatic

1 + 0 = 1 not 0
1 - 0 = 1 not 0

so logically 0 - 1 should be 0 not -1
else 1 - 0 = 1/2

proof: [ (1 + 1) - ( 0 + 0 ) ] = 2 not 1
however, [ ( 1 - 0 ) - ( 1 - 0 ) ] = 0 not 1

if 1 - 0 = 1/2 and 0 - 1 = 0, then

[(1 + 1) - ( 0 + 0 )] = 2 and
[( 1 - 0 ) - ( 1 - 0 )] = 0

in the first case 1 + 1 = 1/2 + 1/2 (unity)
and 0 + 0 = [( 0 - 1 ) + ( 0 - 1 )]

however, we already know that
-1 -1 = -2 not 0, else

[ (1 + 1) - (0 + 0) ] should = 1

in either case 0 + 0 = 1
and 1 + 1 = 1/2 + 1/2

it has the fortunate conclusion of solving the dilemma of

0 - 1 / 1 - 0 = [ ( 1 + 1 ) - ( 0+ 0 ) ] / [ ( 1 - 0 ) - ( 1 - 0) ]

-1 / 1 = (0 - 1) / (1 - 0) = ( 1 + 1) - (0 + 0) / (1 - 0) - (1 - 0) = 1 / 1

else (1 + 1) - (0 + 0) / (0 - 1) + (0 - 1) = 2 / -2

since
(0 - 1) + (0 - 1)
if = 0 not= -2

while (1 + 1) + (0 + 0) = 2

yet -1 + -1 = [(0 - 1) + (0 - 1)]
even if -1 + -1 = -2

furthermore a comparison may be made where

(1 + 1) - (0 + 0) / (0 - 1) + (0 - 1) not= -1 / 1

because [ (1 + 1) - (0 + 0)] not = [(1 - 0) - (1 - 0)]

in the context of the premises 1 + 0 = 1 and 1 - 0 = 1

thus either

(1 + 1) - (0 + 0) / (1 - 0) - (1 - 0) not= (1 + 1) - (0 + 0) / (1 - 0) - (1 - 0)

or -1 / 1 = 2 / -2

or -1 / 1 = 1 / 1

[note: for sanity's sake, perhaps geometry precedes #, I suspect this]

since the last equation seems completely false ( -1 not= 1)

we must approach the idea that -1 / 1 = 2 / -2

Deliberating over previous equations, the conclusion is then that in the first place
(-1) + (-1) = -2

However, this means (0 - 1) + (0 - 1) = -2

Thus (1 - 0) - (1 - 0) not= 0

because logically

1 - 0 / 0 - 1 = 0

However, if 1 - 1 not= 0
this flies in the face of traditional arithmatics

The conclusion then is that 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 0

OR

[(1 + 1) - (0 + 0)] = [(1 - 0) - (1 - 0)]

However, in the view that

1 + 0 = 1 and 1 - 0 = 1

we know that

(1 + 1) - (0 + 0) = 2

and

(1 - 0) - (1 - 0) = 0

although these seem reasonable,
we know either

[(1 + 1) - (0 + 0)] = [(1 - 0) - (1 - 0)]

or

1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 0

if (1 + 1) - (0 + 0) = 2, it is
not= (1 - 0) - (1 - 0) = 0

Thus, either we may question the premises
1 + 0 = 1 and 1 - 0 = 1

OR

1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 0

according to (1 + 1) - {(1 - 0 / 0 - 1)+( 1 - 0 / 0 - 1)} = 0

[equivalent to (1 + 1) - (0 + 0) = (1 - 0) - (1 - 0)]

2 - 0 = 0 if 0 + 0 = 0

AND 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 = 0, however

Since we know either 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 0
or fundamental premises are false,

2 - 0 is not 0, rather

(1 - 0 / 0 - 1) + (1 - 0 / 0 - 1) = 2

or the premises are false [here begins a second notebook titled MXC3 arbitrarily
it might be considered whether this system extended confutes unknowability / unsolvability vis. Godel]

Since (1 - 0 / 0 - 1) + (1 - 0 / 0 - 1) = 2

or 1 + 0 not= 1 and/or 1 - 0 not= 1

The conclusion according to traditional arithmatic is that

1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 1 - 0 / 0 - 1

(else 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 1 - 0 / 0 - 1)

However the conclusion here is that 1 / -1 = 1

and 1 - 0 = 1

if 1 / - 1 = 1 then

(1 / - 1) + (1 / -1) = 2

( 0 - 1 ) + ( 0 - 1) = -2 or -1 not= 1 (according to previously)

then (if premises hold), 1 / -1 + 1/ -1 + [(0 - 1) + (0 - 1)] = 0

if (1 / -1 + 1 / -1) + [(0 - 1) + (0 - 1)] = 0

Then according to traditional basics, 2 - 2 = 0

[However, according to the logic followed as a basis for comparison _ _ _]

since

[(1 + 1) - (0 + 0) not= (1 - 0) - (1 - 0)]

the 2nd equation may be translated as:

1 / -1 + 1 / -1 not= not= 0

since we know by (1 + 1) - (0 + 0) = 2
that also 2 not= (1 - 0) - (1 - 0) = 0

so that

[(1 + 1) - (0 + 0)] not= [ 2 = 0 ]

if 1 / -1 + 1 / -1 not= not= 0 [NOT AN ERROR: EMPHASIS]

then 1 / -1 + 1 / -1 = 0

or equivalent

if so, then

(1 / -1) + (1 / -1) not= 2

thus 1 / -1 not= 1

However, according to previous arguments, the only conclusion flies in the face of traditional arithmatics:

posing 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 1

then either 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 1 - 0 / 0 - 1

OR

1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 0 AND (1 - 0 / 0 - 1) + (1 - 0 / 0 - 1) not= 2

Since it runs agianst all rationality to claim a statement is not itself,

The conclusion is that since 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 0

AND

1 - 0 / 0 - 1 + 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 2

thus

1 + 0 not= 1 AND/OR 1 - 0 not= 1

Since this flies in the face of fundamental mathematics, the most rational thing is to refigure at the primary equations in a manner suiting to resolution_ _ _
The initial assumption was that 1 + 0 = 1 and not 0
and 1 - 0 = 1 and not 0

YET 0 - 1 is -1
AND 0 + 1 is 1 and not 0

Considering on the surface these four entities (surrounding a zero point),

the quadrants are (counterclockwise) 1 + 0 = 1, 0 + 1 = 1, 0 - 1 = -1, and 1 - 0 = 1

The total is 3 and not 0, although they are situated axially around a point of no value--this in itself ought to bring criticism.
(0 - 1 = -1 is the only negative box of four).

Reconsidering, it cannot be concluded that 1 + 0 is other than 1, if zero is actually nothing, nor may it be concluded that one
minus 0 is anything other than 1, if 0 is merely a loss of nothing

Then if the premises may be questioned, it is only in two statements, namely

if 0 - 1 = -1 and
if 0 + 1 = 1

(essentially in my belief these were popularized by Descartes and the Cartesian diagram)

If 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 0

AND

1 - 0 / 0 - 1 + 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 2

if 0 - 1 = - 1 and
1- 0 holds as 1
then (1 / -1) + (1 / -1) not= 0 or 2

However, since 1 / 1 and -1 / -1 are conceived as = 1

and 0 / 0, 1 / 0, and 0 / 1 may be equal to 0

the statement that

1 / 1 - 1 / 1 [equiv. to (1 / 1) + (-1 / 1)]
- [(-1 / 1) + (1 / 1)] = 0

seems to vindicate that two terms, technically opposite, amount to zero

While this isn't startling,
it now comes to the fore that

-1 / 1 + 1 / -1 = 0

[since otherwise opposite terms would not cancel]

Thus saying that

[(1 / 1) + (1 / 1)] - [ (-1 / 1) + (-1 / 1)] = [(-1 / 1) - (-1 / 1)] - [(-1 / 1) - (-1 / 1)]

isn't valid under the arguments

1 - 0 / 0 - 1 + 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 2

and

1 - 0 / 0 - 1 not= 1

[

if (1 / -1) + (-1 / 1) not= 0 then according to arguments [ [(1 - 0 ) / (0 - 1)] + [(1 - 0) / (0 - 1)] / 2] not= (1 - 0) / (0 - 1)


THUS

[(1 + 1) - (0 + 0) = (1 - 0) - (1 - 0)] is true

since the two halves of the basis [(1 + 1) - (0 + 0) = (1 - 0) - (1 - 0)]

are equivalent to

1 + 0 = 1 and 1 - 0 = 1 respectively,

and (1 - 0) / (0 - 1) not= 1

and (1 - 0) / (0 - 1) not= 0

[and [(1 - 0) / (0 - 1)] + [(1 - 0) / (0 - 1)] not= 2]

the avg. [ [(1 - 0) / (0 - 1)] + [(1 - 0) / (0 - 1)] / 2 ] in equivalence to 1 - 0 / 0 - 1

substantiates the following: if 1 / -1 = 0

then (tentatively)

1 - 0 / 0 - 1 + 1 - 0 / 0 - 1 = 1/2

and

1 - 0 / 0 - 1 = 2

However, the clear conclusion here upon simplifying terms is that

1 / -1 + 1 / -1 = 1/2

and

1 / -1 = 2

Although easily reproofed under conventions, under the earlier arguments these serve to substantiate
criticism not of the first premises ( 1 + 0 = 1 and 1 - 0 = 1), instead the 2nd two

[1] That 0 - 1 should be 0
and not -1
(else 1 - 0 = 1/2
since (1 + 1) - (0 + 0) = 2
not 1 yet (1 - 0) - (1 - 0) is 0 not 1)

(1 - 0) + (0 - 1) = 1/2 or (1 + 0) + ( 0 - 1) = 0 in spite of 0 + 0 + 1 + 1 = 2 and 0 doing no operation :: vis. the earlier example of equivalent terms
yet (1 + 1) - ( 0 + 0) not= (1 + 0) - (1 + 0)

AND

[2] 0 + 1 should be 0 not 1
(since -0 + 1 = 1)
else -1 + 0 = 1
(cancellation of signs)
else pending argument of the validity of positive or negative numbers since the view of zero as a canceller is promoted in these methods, yet also in the concept that -0 + 1 = 1 in the context of cancelling operators [EMPHASIS]

This altered view, although utterly insane by most standards, suggests an alternate approach to mathematics in which an attenuated proportion within the traditional graduated system (e.g. for example integral numbers redefined in terms of fractions or geometry) provides a foundation for a calculative method

Maybe sometime it will be determined for a childhood like mine, that calculus was too diabolical, we needed a diabolical calculus

[18th 5 X 7" page in a day, 6/11/2008]

Ismics

Polyptics: the most arrogant people cease to know that they don't know; the most humble find ignorance to be the ground of truth (somehow by opposition, the most opposed things approach a middle ground and remain as unbalanced as themselves)

Limnics: there is no wall in my eyes to keep me from swallowing the voices of birds (evoking birdsong)

Hyperdimensionism: higher thoughts take form, lower forms return to return (like a hypercube, there is an interstasis between formation and shape; both an idea and an activity)

Eridianism: the aperture of miscellany is ideal (philosophical beauty)

Isometry: a resemblance varies by value

Adding & an Addendum

Recent events: (amen) drawings given freely to Yale School of Architecture [maybe preserved? or student-taken?] (breth) Philosophy project succeeding again (coda) website discovered at artistrising.com taking images etc. [some work involved] (degre) symbolic interest thriving, developing composed pages on parchment paper from Kinko's (ept) can afford sandwiches again thanks to my mother's reduced rent requirements (fear) intent emerging to consider perpetual motion seriously again, although psychologically this has been very disheartening--a concept can seem like gold and I utterly lack the impetus to develop it (goda) some things seem to click--I've found a health drink, a possible therapist, I may move out of my parents' house, my projects are developing, my public image is improving, and flirting is occasionally possible; new zones of serendipity or trial seem feasible (haleh) much depends on the life of system e.g. a book or art presence that seems real (iten) as a product-oriented talent I need reassurance that something may be marketed e.g. results emotionally and financially (jend) a public voice or interest may do wonders; I may push noteriety successfully via the web, radio, or a print article (kamen) having a substrate of dependable factors is reassuring when true (levend) when I find shui I give shui, as best I may (mend) personality changes seem much more possible now, to good effect life-willing (namen) formulas may create results (omen) signs of fortune seem like incredible fangled wonders of variegate light (preh) self-law permitted, I must only sustain myself to work wonders or apparent wonders (quit) by default, when things are out of place I may remain with new poems and boiled cocoa (rela) maybe eventually I'll find that college that takes people for books and art, not murder or sex (sola) some emblems or accoutrements work wonders on their own--radiant coils of light, watches and handbags (tredna) maybe the least of wonders is to find myself amongst different architecture (uter) words vary yet vary in their results--important moment of fact (vivend) good things may come not as death (wish) zones of principle sometimes have life, even from above (xilla) sometimes wisdom or shrewdness is the aperture between a material place of accomplishment and a definite feeling of the known (yew) I look for outlooks (zona) sometimes it is enough to compose a desk with small stones [say it isn't death by drugged zen]

Notebook project

I've found eleven errors of reasoning--widely known as fallacies--that fit neatly into a concept-project for a 400-pg. book; so far only 49; maybe realistically its a sixth so that's progress, however I often go rather far with an outline before leaving it in its fishbones as something that ought to have lived

As an additional note, punctuation may be rhetorical with some equivalence to frequent boolean operators (such as "and", "if", "ifthen", "yet", "or", "when", "is roughly", etc.)

,, may denote extensis of reason into a proceeding element, as of a rhetorical pause

_ _ _ the dashed ellipsis (maybe solipsis) may connote a continuing trend rather than an awkward dream

| | | | caesura dividers have a quality of categorality lending itself to || good quotes ||, | element | s |, and l | eve | l ||| di | st | in | c | t | ions as of paper games or the mysterious wave variance

colors may also denote in the same manner as letters an implicit cohensis or scriation to the process of expositing language as though it were spoken with the tongue

Bastions_for_Motists

Motists like Cynics might be bastards of the world: e.g. as old men are fools or cynics dogs Motists accrete negative terminology expressing their terrible compensatory lack of character in one department: 'philosophical_animals'

in this case 'bastion' is a philosophical construct, a fortress from which the stones of truth are flung [in all complicit drama: e.g. with the extravagence of holy fools]

Eucalehscript_Numeration

My earlier runescript known as Aemenbreth might be supplemented with numerals as such[symbological]:

Color-Scripting as Emotional Language

Plan_Aggendum_July_2008

Inkling_July_2008

Relating to Moral Philosophy

Assuming the consequence; an expression I see in terms of the logical fallacy of 'begging the question';

instead of proving terms by themselves, its possible that in a systemic case (terms being requisite) that something may follow from a position of balance or appreciation; the fallacy in this case or potential fallacy is that a factual or systemic basis is extended into resolution; e.g. insofar as no factual or systemic change is made, one cannot rightfully conclude that deductions are real

Moral philosophy in the context of the idiosyncracy of Heideggar, incl. the emergence of a western concept of being and becomingness (in my mind mirrored in eastern philosophy, perhaps with greater success) points towards the idea that in the context of assuming the consequence, the fallacy of becomingness is not inherently the fallacy of being: the basis for truth is not simply fact or validity, but the way in which a logic, whether moral or otherwise, consequents the trend of seeking universals or the identity of individual systems or coherents;

That is, while begging the question implies circularity and non-substance (in which case the fallacy is that the argument is specious), assuming the consequence has the same error, with the exception that the problem is that an implicit system assumes a system will follow; in fact, either the system has no basis, or the process of reasoning must be as balanced and logical as the system or framework adopted

In relation to categories, one may say for example that in the first case spheres are circles but not all circles spheres (via typology) [it would be begging the question to say spheres are circles because circles are spheres] however one cannot say that a circle will roll on a two-dimensional plane counterposing it, whereas the sphere seems adequate; likewise in systems, dimensionalism implies singularity; the circle-ness of spheres becomes more adequate in representing the class circle within the context of two dimensions conceived in the experiential sense of being pan-dimensional

Similar themes occur in the seemingly sadistic work of the founder of semiotics, who says very little about any related field

Extranea

life may improve in skill without great reward; yet reward at all may be an improvement; in this case, is skill called mastery? Or in such a position, must one know that this is a simplification to 'I suffer, I must beg', as a a poet at first must find some verse false, and find his heart in his voice, or no life walking in the world?

writing bones isn't always finding the print that drips in others' eyes I find, as though by winding my way through forests of transcience, or some selfish declaration I'm mostly missing my own breath, unless by words I mean a garden, or in speaking I've already accomodated a heart that hurts willingly, or knows the war of following after something more significant than this, as though I know others' voices in my mind, not that they are mine, but rather that my voice follows therefrom, and cannot steal them or attribute its own voice to its mouth, or a mouth it seeks, yet knows commonwise there are ways to fall into a mold in which I speak and do not feel, others finding my garden only bones, which are fragmented from their own path in following a trail beneath the most perfect winters which I'm convinced at times give birth to love 'love rose from winter like a garden'

as much as few know both fish and abyss, the place of attributes and logichems is as rote in idea as one cannot know inspite of following some great storm

so much from inscriptions