This book is the 4th volume of the Dimensional Encyclopedia.
Take heart that I found almost none of the concepts in the hour+ crash course on phenomenology unfamiliar. Add a little originality and an intellectual voice, and the effect is not destined to be very bad. The book is currently on schedule.
To celebrate my love for phenomenology, I will abbreviate some of the concepts and insights I derived from the crash course in phenonomenology video (I think a lot of student phenomenologists if they were being honest would say they never learned anything more about phenomenology than what that guy taught in the course).
Here are the full notes I took to the video. Some of these are my own theses:
NOTES ON PHENOMENOLOGY
*Time, consciousness.
*We cannot know the unknown.
*Can we decide that knowledge isn’t a formalism? Isn’t that like deciding that it is not specific? Generality might easily be an emotion, and an emotion might be incoherent.
*Incoherent emotions --- idea.
*At what point does the dialectic escape the problem?
*Problem of Eden --- shame ~ self-consciousness
*Escaping causal and nomological explanations such as laws of nature.
*Jeff Yeshimi ---- neuroscientist (?) who does phenomenology, connecting the two.
*Hiedeggar: there is no subject, then later he found it.
*The question of what it is----metaphysics.
*Husserl argues for physicalism, then insists objects were constructed.
*Moods disclose the content of reality.
*Moods do not explain anything objectively: psychology.
*The need to avoid objectivity --- the case of frustration without a source.
*Concept of Seeming.
*When we try to interpret our mind, this creates uncertainty about the content.
*The content is otherwise less uncertain, but qualified with the unknown.
*Theme of contrast. Neither here nor there.
*Experience requires an object for reality, but not for experience. Experience becomes unreal when it has no object. Immaterial objects are necessary in the sense that they are personal.
*Husserl: form versus substance, prefers form for explaining experience (intensional objects).
*If we don’t determine experience, then our objects are located in a kind of space and time (relevance).
*Real --- physical
*Raal -- flux
*Ideal---formal structures
*Eidetic
*Epoche --- focusing on the intensional content.
*Reduction ---- Husserl procedure to show experience, Merleau-Ponty says its impossible.
*Determinately indeterminate.
*Gnomatic explosion
*Adumbrating further possible experiences --- corruscation.
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