Continuing the subject of what I call pseudoscience;
A class text discusses the development of empiricism from Locke, to Berkeley, and Hume, (and the Logical Positivists, who I will ignore for now); Evidently according to the text, Kant's morality is the only major rebuttal to what are otherwise sound arguments; For example, Hume's fork (the choice between synthetic and analytic statements, or else nonsense) has been used to deconstruct the concept of god into a hypothetical condition that is at best neither real nor unreal without evidence (Catholics argue that the world itself is evidence, whereas others respond that the world is not proof evidence of what the Catholics claim; and what is evidence without proof? It is not evidence at all);
Nonetheless, to an irrationalist such as myself, who believes that some very exceptional truths influence truth-statements, and even that no exceptional reason is ordinary, the empirical claim does not look like consolation, it just looks like a way of being lazy; What are scientists doing engaging in science without very unusual hypotheses organized in sets and rows to compensate for the mundanity of testing procedures? Some would say that the excitement of science has only begun, or that it has always been present; And as a result, I have been persuaded to attempt writings about biology and psychology, which I plan to eventually self-publish.
What is the conventional consolation of empiricism? Perhaps there isn't one; Old writings are full of stories of how dark and cold or behaviorist science is or has become; So we can scarcely say that, from that plateau, the new trend is 'futurism'? Can we? What is advanced except an idea? So at what point do scientific ideas become concrete? From an onlookers vantage point it may appear that only the most advanced developments have intellectual cachet, and even so, only ephemerally; What does this say about the consolation of empiricism?; Is the value merely a scientific routine?
Intention and Architecture, by Carolyn Fahey
6 years ago