People die when their histories are lost.
—Paroxysmus
Knowledge can be favored for practical reasons.
—Unknown
It isn’t really until its complete and if it happens to be scientific—Some philosophers today might love being called scientists, but not all of them
—Unknown
What follows from a premise is the action taken to produce the result.
—Kripkenstein
Disjunctions… if they are used as premises support truth value.
—Kripkenstein
Intuitionist logics… How it is treated becomes the truth-value.
—Kripkenstein
It depends… whether the premises adopt the structure of the argument.
—Kripkenstein
One term might be expressed as many terms, and thus truth must be expressed in terms of functions.
—Kripkenstein
Analyzability is potentially disconnected between the logical agents of an argument… the argument itself must make the claim.
—Kripkenstein
Under the definition of canonical and sub-object it might be easier to determine how they work within various different models.
—Kripkenstein
Subobjects… might be shown to be interdependent on a larger, overall more explicable structure.
—Kripkenstein
Sensation can be rationalized, just as many other things can also be done with it.
—N. Coppedge
The feeling of an object of sensation such as a piece of fuzz can be smaller in its impression than it's ultimate idea.
—N. Coppedge
Now, by rationality particular behaviors are adopted which may not be universal… relative to limited observations, rationality, sensation, or other concepts.
—N. Coppedge
What we mean by knowledge is not meaningless knowledge… if knowledge were meaningless we would have the same problem we had without knowledge.
—N. Coppedge
Although knowledge is concerned with the good… there is nothing which makes meaning inherently expensive or… should make us assume that when it is meaningful it must be impractical.
—N. Coppedge
What is meant by good in every way is if it is meaningful to the point of being practical.
—N. Coppedge
The practical consists of an elevation of the good, that is, meaning.
—N. Coppedge
We can trace the path of higher meaning… into… subjects like philosophy and art that are most pleasurable to… those who do not declare life to be meaningless.
—N. Coppedge
Meaning… is at least a lack of meaninglessness.
—N. Coppedge
Concepts are good, and so they have meaning, and so they are an elevation of practicality.
—N. Coppedge
And where what is good must have meaning, so too what is meaningful must be the only elevation of practicality.
—N. Coppedge
The ultimate is any exceptional thing, which has its own meaning, good or bad, and… can be judged ultimately practical or impractical.
—N. Coppedge
Many ultimate things are in fact the …things we ought to take for granted… because they have practical meaning.
—N. Coppedge
There are techniques… For example, finding significance. Or strategizing… happy events.
—N. Coppedge
Many of these [strategies]… since they aim at the extreme, involve a kind of madness.
—N. Coppedge
So… there might be a practical and also an exaggerated view of an object, which puts it somewhere in the space of finding significance.
—N. Coppedge
The sometimes extremely useful practical meaning of each object.
—N. Coppedge
If something could be bad when it is exaggerated, it clearly does not have practical meaning, and so, it must be unrelated to the good, and so, it must be somewhat unethical to consider it. And when it is unethical to consider it, it is unlikely to involve itself in any kind of good life. And so, there is a sense of ethical virtues related to the exaggeration of practical meaning.
—N. Coppedge
The ethical person is one who can exaggerate his every sensation and still find meaning. This means that everything is subject to critique.
—N. Coppedge
If he is to be virtuous there will be no forgiveness, nor will there be any punishment other than meaninglessness.
—N. Coppedge
And so, we see it that the difference between the good life and the bad life is that the good life has significance, and the bad life is merely superficial, because the bad life is full of the meaningless things.
—N. Coppedge
The first property of meaning is sensation, impression, interpretation, or synthesis, all of which require an intellectual experience and often a lack of discomfort. The second property of meaning is a state, quality, dynamic, or symbolism that makes meaning possible. A meaningful experience is not just sensation, impression, interpretation, or synthesis, but some specific state, quality, dynamic, or symbolism that has a particular fascination, pleasure, curiosity, or charm. The third property of meaning is the context, existence, pursuit, or impetus which makes the fascination, pleasure, curiosity, or charm substantial enough to take part in the intellectual experience that is not uncomfortable. The context, existence, pursuit, or impetus may be involved with languages (logic), systems (elaborate structures and organizations), guarantees (physical laws), and ideas (intellectually justified events and information) which motivate and permit substantiality. The fourth property of meaning is it's activity, usefulness, value, and consequence for sensations, impressions, interpretations, and syntheses. For example, meaning may affect the manner in which substance (infinity), improbability (commonness), uniqueness (universalism), and perfection (qualification or evolution) are activated, effective, valued, and consequential.
—N. Coppedge
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