Friday, October 26, 2012

Towards a New Compatibilism

My intuition is a will that is a function of matter and space; The ascription of a will upon a dynamic surface is merely psychological, a matter of self-identification; Whenever the individual can ascribe a result of individuality, even a subjective feeling, to an object that may be observed, this connotes a certain kind of will; But I will not go on to say that all forms of will are merely a matter of perception; Indeed, science more often than not these days will admit that there is some influence of mind upon matter; The more the interesting aspect of matter is discovered, the more it seems to connote our own innate processes, that is, not always volition, but perhaps volition may be termed a small concept; When it is determined that the will is a small concept, it may also be determined that in a field of psychological influences, the will may be one of them; One had merely determine, for example, that consequence is not an imperative of the active volition; It may be that there is an affirmative volition (an idea whose time has come), that one had merely to find a concept that is desired, implicating passivity or ambition (as validity), OR the presence of a concept of willful continuation of motive in the individual; So in a sense what determinists are claiming is that there is a subjective character of volition in the mind; Therefore, for those that oppose subjectivity, such an argument for determinism will not hold; And claiming that determinism and the will are both meaningless concepts does not resolve the original question; What if subjectivity were more or less real than the determined will?; Or if will could not exist without determinism?; It seems possible that a Darwinian theory could place volition ahead of deterministic development, a theory whose disparagers I cannot fully agree with;

What if determinism is ultimately as specialized a concept as the will? For example, it may be stated that without another influence for comparison, a determined context is merely a context without intelligence; Does this assume that intelligence is willful? Or is it ridiculous not to have gray areas between determinism and the will? For example, isn't it possible that determinism exists in multiple categories, and hence, the assumption of determinism is only the assumption of a single definition? Once it looks like a single definition, isn't it inadequate to say that it applies to all types of matter? Then doesn't it look more likely that there is AT LEAST A SINGLE EXCEPTION? But if this were so, the definitions would be identical, unless free-will also exists in degrees. One solution to this is to accept multiple intermediate categories, at which point the original thesis returns, that free-will and determinism are themselves small categories; Along the lines of the prospect that life or consciousness itself is a rather rare specialization (although one that may be open to many imitations); Does a specialized existence look determined or willful? I find this ambiguous; Free-will may easily be thought of as a specialization of an otherwise determined world; To accept determinism tends to be an acceptance of a smaller number of options; Where free-will accepts two or more categories, becoming a law of variety, determinism accepts only one, a law of meaninglessness; Must determinism be meaningless? Determinists would argue no, but as such they are accepting a meaningless definition; The variety that determinists find is a variety with definition, when factually definitions depend on evolutionary, couched, and preferential meanings (even preferential realities) arguing otherwise runs against evolution;

In one case, it can be argued that libertarianism can be accepted as a thought experiment: for if two equally meaningful options are offered, the decision can be seen as a function that is not contingent; either we accept that the options are not meaningful, or it can be established that there is some system of meaning (in the mind or experience) which allows for the result; When the system of meaning is seen to be arbitrary in value, e.g. when another option is known to be equally viable, the source of the desirable determination for one result over another equal result must be a product of the will; This is more certain when it is determined that some aspects of the mind are themselves contingent, both to the value of the incident, and to the indeterminacy of the incident; To disagree on these extra forms of contingency is to disagree with the complexity of the mind, resulting in a simplistic thesis; Yet what determinists typically argue is not any form of simplicity (and it is not that my argument depends on this), but rather a form of unknown; It by this unknown factor, such as by asking 'why'? that I mean to pose the concept of contingency; But am I questioning that 'determinations' are not a factor of available tools? No, actually available tools have always been a meaningless issue for free will, considered as a spatial and contingent concept of determination; And equally I could argue that tools are a meaningful issue contextually, only because they have bearing on practical considerations; One should not argue therefore that free-will is impossible, only that the powers of will are not always a function of the properties of an 'iron sword' or a 'glass and metal telescope'; The idea that it was so contingent upon objects is really a variety of confabulism, which mistakes the labeling properties of things for the meanings, psychological or otherwise, to which we attribute our motivations;

Determinism has many false theses, which some determinists disagree with:
[1] Matter is of one kind (false materialism)
[2] There is no contingency of the true kind (false dimensionism)
[3] The mind does not exist independent of objects (false coherency)
[4] Complexity does not entail opposite concepts (false dichotomy or ideation)

Free-will accepts more agreeable versions of the theses:
[1] Matter varies, it is matter IFF (if and only if) it is matter
[2] True contingency exists between values and determinations via free-will
[3] The mind may sometimes exist in a manner that is not a function of objects
[4] Free-will exists as an opposite concept to arbitrary determination

The compatibilist view of these four thesis opposites would run thus, against some of the tenets of traditional compatibilism:
[1] Matter is determined, but true determinacy (a more qualified definition) is a function of will
[2] Free-will is the only contingency in a material world, unless significance is favored
[3] The mind is a material with differences from other materials
[4] Free-will is not an opposite concept to determinism, in that more extreme concepts are possible

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