Saturday, June 7, 2008

Relating to Moral Philosophy

Assuming the consequence; an expression I see in terms of the logical fallacy of 'begging the question';

instead of proving terms by themselves, its possible that in a systemic case (terms being requisite) that something may follow from a position of balance or appreciation; the fallacy in this case or potential fallacy is that a factual or systemic basis is extended into resolution; e.g. insofar as no factual or systemic change is made, one cannot rightfully conclude that deductions are real

Moral philosophy in the context of the idiosyncracy of Heideggar, incl. the emergence of a western concept of being and becomingness (in my mind mirrored in eastern philosophy, perhaps with greater success) points towards the idea that in the context of assuming the consequence, the fallacy of becomingness is not inherently the fallacy of being: the basis for truth is not simply fact or validity, but the way in which a logic, whether moral or otherwise, consequents the trend of seeking universals or the identity of individual systems or coherents;

That is, while begging the question implies circularity and non-substance (in which case the fallacy is that the argument is specious), assuming the consequence has the same error, with the exception that the problem is that an implicit system assumes a system will follow; in fact, either the system has no basis, or the process of reasoning must be as balanced and logical as the system or framework adopted

In relation to categories, one may say for example that in the first case spheres are circles but not all circles spheres (via typology) [it would be begging the question to say spheres are circles because circles are spheres] however one cannot say that a circle will roll on a two-dimensional plane counterposing it, whereas the sphere seems adequate; likewise in systems, dimensionalism implies singularity; the circle-ness of spheres becomes more adequate in representing the class circle within the context of two dimensions conceived in the experiential sense of being pan-dimensional

Similar themes occur in the seemingly sadistic work of the founder of semiotics, who says very little about any related field

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