Monday, September 3, 2007

Investigations 2

There are several points made in the first investigation that bear particularly on the impetus of this writing; first, the importance of the physical as a basis combined with the special need for multiple categories (that is no consistent standard of categorization such as quantity, intensity, association, relatedness etc.), leads to the idea that the physical in fact consists of signifiers, not in a strictly literal or even symbolic sense, but in the sense of distinct properties which may be apprehended by the mind, through which multiple objects may be compared. (It goes without saying that these may be sensory properties such as heat and cold, or abstracted properties of mental objects).

Thus the landscape being considered is the landscape of meaning, which bears on the second point, that the intentionalism being considered is the intention of meaning within such a field, which cannot be considered as arbitrary for that itself is founded on the notion that life as a whole is arbitrary (since the intention necessarily is founded within reality), if we keep in mind that matter cannot be rationalized apart from meaning, and there is no import in a strict sense without some subtle sense of intentionality, intentionality generally being distinguished from the arbitrary.

Thirdly, although the field of categories is not limited by one consistent standard, the properties of these "apprehended objects" as separate from the outward aspect may be combined such that through intention the inherent reason of their physicality is categorically manifest as equally real. That is, if we combine the apprehended properties of two things that are recognized as having the capacity to make impressions, it is unreasonable to think that no impression would be made. In fact, it is more reasonable to think that the combination makes no impression insofar as they have not been combined. Intention becomes important in distinguishing between combined "masses" or fixed objects, and logically or categorically combined properties of (meaningful) objects.(~1)

What is implicated here is that essentially within a pragmatic system of categories partially defined by the available tools, life itself as it is understood rationally transforms amongst a field of properties, which insofar as they are rational have a consistent relatedness with one another. This isn't to say that anyone qualified by rationality would know everything, but simply that insofar as tools may be defined holistically (that is, their breadth known), within any system of interpretation the combinations may be considered categorically finite. This isn't to say there are not infinite variations within a category, or that all systems are holistic, or even that the sum of all systems is a holism. It simply implies that categorical reason is a shortcut to great leaps, and that the system of categories, insofar as it is complete, almost constitutes a metaphysics. Yet only insofar as it permits transformation, indicating that such a system consists not of fixed categories of populations or realities-as-they-are, but rather categories of properties themselves related categorically.


1. Intention becomes a means of apprehending in a direct way a mental situation in terms of available objects. Objects without intention tend towards the arbitrary. Yet the intention of the individual often conflicts with the contradiction of the intentions of objects, such that reason becomes concerned with an arbitration of the arbitrary; that is, qualifying the arbitrary as, in fact, arbitrary (and things without arbitrary qualities as not arbitrary).

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